Emmanuel ManolakasIS 795Research Design PaperDecember 11, 2017CanChina Rise Peacefully?IntroductionChinais entering the world arena dynamically, conflicting with the American congestedand irregular power capabilities and novel war paradigms, that came fromancient Chinese strategic intellect. The rise of China is substantiallyupsetting the international balance of power.
The power disparity between Chinaand the United States is reducing and most likely, the US strategic prevalencein the region will no longer endure (Mearsheimer, 2010). Nevertheless, this doesnot automatically foresee the withdrawal of the U.S.
from the region. Incontrast, the U.S. presence is perhaps going to increase due to China’s rise. However,one thing is certain, the United States will no longer be the most prominentpower in the region, as it has been since 1945 (Mearsheimer, 2010). From the time when China joined theWorld Trade Organization in 2001, it has attained the world’s fastest rate ofeconomic development. Its foreign trade and investment has grown dramatically,which has formed substantial consequences on world economy and internationalrelations.
Furthermore, since the late 1980s, China’s defense spending continuedto grow quickly, thus, making the concept of “rise of China” attract even moreattention globally (Yue, 2008). The United States and Japan saw the risingChina with realist uncertainties which showed that China will most likely opposethe international system, marking it with its industrial economic power and militarycapability expansion and mobilization (Yue, 2008).Furthermore,common concerns about the intentions of China’s rapidly increasing militarycapabilities are intensified by its low military transparency, which expandsoverall uncertainty and particular concerns about its capabilities and objectives.
China’s immense claims over islands and topographies in the South and EastChina Seas precede its present rise by decades (Liff & Ikenberry, 2014).Thus far, as China’s military capabilities develop, it is gradually capable ofproclaiming these claims in a way that it was unable to do a few years ago.Thecase of the rise of China is a security dilemma case. Security dilemma is atype of insecurity relationship between states that provokes militarycompetition and arms races that each state could avoid if only it could obtaintrustworthy commitments of the other side’s peaceful intentions. The actorsinvolved are not following offensive security policies and do not pursue dominationor conquest, but are status quo security-seekers. Both sides would favor spendinglimited resources bettering domestic wellbeing and participating in othernonmilitary quests. Although, mistrust and uncertainty about intentions direct themto interpret each other’s defensive actions as offensive, making them seemthreatening (Liff & Ikenberry, 2014).Mediaopenness has also been characterized as one of the most important mechanismsfor the noticeable lack of war by Jarrod Hayes in his article “The DemocraticPeace and the New Evolution of an Old Idea.
” Media are important in the processof political representation of many nations. It is much easier for anindividual, or a state, to get a sense of the political identity of a nationthrough its portray by various media (Hayes, 2012). Countriescould engage in war, or any other type of conflict, when they are uncertainabout the intentions of other countries. Media work in fixing this problem ofuncertainty and perhaps misconception of a state’s interest in the world order.
Media play a fundamental role in politics, as they are often referred to as thefourth branch of government in a democratic political system. Media are essentialcomponents of political life, because they transfer information and aidcommunication between countries. Based on that, one can say that war, conflict,or any other type of crisis, can be avoided in world politics (Potter , 2010).Lastly,the importance of political leaders’ character qualities in domestic andinternational politics of states is a subject that cannot be overlooked. Inforeign policy interests are more significant to the extent that leaders’personality traits may surpass their nation, add a positive value to it, or mayhave a negative impact on their nation’s image. Nowadays, when one takes a lookat the leaders who appear the most in the world media, one can easily realizethat they come to the front with their individual characteristics as well astheir nations’ political and economic power. Theory In the past decades, in Euro-Americaand Japan, there has been a debate about whether a rising China could be athreat or an opportunity. Is it a traditional status quo power to be joined withor a growing revisionist state to be confined (Callahan, 2005)? On one side, Chinahas been gradually seen as a status quo power that adopts a more constructive andless confrontational approach toward regional and global affairs.
On the otherside, others are worried about the economic and security suggestions that sucha quick economic growth could have on the regional order in Asia, as China utilizesits new affluence, in order to revolutionize its military (Callahan, 2005). From the late 1970s, China’s maintheme has been to reform and opening up, with China’s interior modifications urginga transformation in its relationship with international society. The theme of reformand opening up continues to be the central concept in Chinese politics. Theresult was that China discarded most of its radical opposition to the West, whichstarted more than a decade before the end of the Cold War, and reintroduced itspre-1949 plan of assimilating itself with international society based ondomestic transformations (Buzan, 2010). This overall viewpoint is adopted byother experts who also see both a distinct shift in China’s relationship withinternational society during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and continuingrigidities between China’s revisions and the transformation of internationalsociety.
Not until the 1980s were China’s domestic affairs cleared up enough topermit it to get involved politically with international society on anon-revolutionist basis (Buzan, 2010). China’s rise over the past thirty yearssurely looks peaceful paralleled to that of most other recent great powers.Thechange was propelled by interior advances in China, during the late 1970s andearly 1980s, in which the country experienced an overwhelming change ofnational identity, strategic culture, and definition of its security concerns,all of which have altered its relationship with the international society.
Thefundamental change was giving priority towards the improvement of the nationaleconomy, which drove the country farther away from its earlier revolutionist thinkingtowards international society and towards a more status quo title (Buzan,2010). This was apparent through itsparticipation in numerous international institutions and the acknowledgement ofmost of the predominant rules and norms overseeing both the regional and globaleconomic and political mandates. Granting urgency to this development, signifiedthat China desired to transform its security interests from the military, political,and territorial ones that dictated earlier decades and emphasized struggle andzero-sum conflict, into more obliging, comprehensive security ones highlightingthe preservation of stability and involvement in the global political economy(Buzan, 2010).U.
S.foreign policy concerning East Asia since the early 1990s has principally beena notable achievement, notwithstanding certain prominent and tenacious regionaldifficulties. The region benefits from greater economic interdependence than itdid in the early 1990s, and multilateral diplomacy has been increasingsignificantly since the mid-1990s. Furthermore, China has been at the focus ofthis regional integration development, thus enhancing China’s motivations forcooperation with its neighbors, including the allies of the U.S (Christensen,2006).
These political and economic phenomena aid in lessening securityconcerns, averting rises of tension, and decreasing strategic misperceptionsthat frequently weaken international relations in periods of structural change. Scholars of international relations accept as true thatmisperception and uncertainty are key reasons in determining whether statesparticipate in interstate clashes. Based on that, war is regarded as a creationof uncertainty and misperception about the objectives of other states. In otherwords, if states obtain access to trustworthy information on capability andresolution of other states, it is most likely that that military conflict willdecrease due to the reassurance of one another’s intentions (Choi and James,2007).
Intheir article “Media Openness, Democracy and Militarized Interstate Disputes,”Seung-Whang Choi and Patrick James argue that in game-theoretic terms, it is inferredthat the likelihood of war should reach zero under “complete and perfectinformation.” For instance, they argue that domestic political structure can stronglyaffect a state’s capability to indicate its intentions and to make reliablecommitments concerning foreign policy (Choi and James, 2007).Whetheror not the media are satisfactorily open and trustworthy will contribute to thesuccessful communication flow of information on foreign policy actions acrossborders and improve each government’s credibility and validity. A high degreeof media openness has a tendency to improve uncertainty and misperceptionbetween states, so it increases confidence and predictions for peaceful resolutions.Regardless of the possible importance of media openness, research on thedemocratic peace usually has focused its attention on other institutional andcultural elements of democracy (Choi and James, 2007).Inhis article, Scott Wolford studies a model of crisis negotiating in the shadowof a leadership turnover, in which sequential leaders of the same state might fluctuatein their resolve, their resolve is private information, and the likelihood ofleadership turnover rests on negotiating behavior and conflict consequences.This model offers new answers to several questions about the relationshipbetween an official’s time in office, the predictions of losing office, the expectedbehavior of future leaders, and the existing possibility of conflict.
Engagedtogether, these results increase recent claims that leaders should be thoughtof as the central components of analysis in international relations (Wolford,2007).Sinceofficials have private information over their resolution, they have a motivationto build a status that promises better crisis negotiation outcomes over time. Simultaneously,adversaries have an incentive to trial officials’ resolution through crisis negotiation.This progression of reputation building happens in the shadow of leadershipturnover, which itself is a role of an official’s negotiating behavior, which takesto power a successor with new private information. Therefore, each leader whotakes office begins the cycle again, and the motivations of both officials andantagonists efficiently trap them into taking actions that rise the probabilityof conflict. In this manner, the model tells a clear story about how and when theprivate information and motivations to distort that may generate conflict ininternational relations (Wolford, 2007).Hypothesis From this research, I would like tofind out if an indicator of media openness has a strong effect on transparency,interdependence and the creation of trust between China and the United States,leading to a lack of war, and also how much of a role leadership has in theequation. Media have created a sense of openness in the world spectrum as theyhelped in the eradication of secrecy of the political actions worldwide.
Manyscholars argue that by enriching a nation’s knowledge of another nation’spolitical identity and actions, it decreases the notion of threat that leads tothe lack of war amongst the nations.China’sconduct of newly elected leaders depends mainly on two factors. First, whethera candidate’s campaign language was constant with other indicators of thecandidate’s aims toward China, and second, whether the candidate swore tochange the China policy of his or her predecessor. As the economic and securityrelations of the United States and China are firmly entangled, Chinesespectators pay close attention to what U.S. presidential candidates say,regardless of the conservative perception that elected leaders abandon theircampaign promises on China for more practical policies after taking office(Miura & Weiss, 2016).Thisshows that China indeed pays a lot of attention to the leadership of the UnitedStates.
It is only safe to assume that the United States does the same think,regarding the big effect leaders of nations have in their foreign policyconducts. Furthermore, one can notice that recently, Donald Trump’s unusualcandidacy and ascension to the White House have presented massive uncertaintyin the course of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. According to these suspicions,it would be useful to examine whether a combination of media transparency andthe nature of these nations leaderships and leaders would be a good indicator ofChina’s peaceful rise.TheUnited States is also dedicated to lead in the Asia-Pacific region, and so its stateinterests request its deep engagement. The United States quickly deployable forcesin Asia guarantee comprehensive regional stability, aid to discourageaggression against its allies, and add to the remarkable political and economicdevelopments made by the nations of the region (Nye, 1995). For the securityand success of today to be preserved for the next years to come, the UnitedStates must continue to be engaged in Asia, dedicated to peace in the region,and devoted to establishing alliances and friendships.
Research Design Since China has been experiencing asubsequently long period of peace from the 1980s on and since the growth of themedia in the world has been consistently rising, I will base my study on datacollected from a cross-sectional, time-series dataset of the United States andChina from 1980 to 2017. Based on that, I want to find out if an indicator ofmedia openness and political leadership has a strong effect on transparency,interdependence, and the creation of trust between these two states, thusleading to a lack of war and potentially, to a peaceful rise of a rapidlygrowing China. Iwill also include certain case studies between different political administrationsfrom both nations, to include a more collective view of my predicament. Forinstance, I will gather information on media representation of political issuesbetween the United States and China which will include proof of the foreignpolicies adopted by the leaders of both countries. This way, I will have a more clear andcollective view of the character of the leaders (hawkish or dovish) and perhapsthe opinions of each state’s population during these times. Some other usefuldate to look at would be how political leaders handled foreign policy crisesduring that time and how the media had covered it.Sincepolitical leaders have private information over their resolution, they have a motivationto build a status that promises better crisis negotiation outcomes over time.
Simultaneously,adversaries have an incentive to trial officials’ resolution through crisis negotiation.This progression of reputation building happens in the shadow of leadershipturnover, which itself is a role of an official’s negotiating behavior, which takesto power a successor with new private information. Therefore, each leader whotakes office begins the cycle again, and the motivations of both officials andantagonists efficiently trap them into taking actions that rise the probabilityof conflict (Wolford, 2007).
This will give me a clearer view of how and when theprivate information and motivations to distort that may generate conflict ininternational relations. A good example of data collection that I could followwould be what Elizabeth Saunders used in her article “Transformative choices:Leaders and the origins of intervention strategy.” Her article adds to a currentstimulation of interest in the role of leaders in international relations by offeringa modest but influential typology of leaders that reports variations in howstates interfere over time. The analytical variable focuses on how leaders seethreats and whether they believe that the interior characteristics of other nationsare the decisive source of threats (Saunders, 2009). This difference in leaders’ fundamentalbeliefs about the source of threats generates two distinctive ways to measureand rank the numerous threats that states tackle. First, the “internallyfocused” leaders perceive a causative relationship among threatening foreignand security policies and the interior structure of states. Therefore, they aremore eager to commence “transformative interventions,” in which the interveningstate is severely implicated in the construction or reconstruction of domesticinstitutions in the affected state (Saunders, 2009).
Onthe other hand, “externally focused” leaders identify threats straight from theforeign and security policies of other states, and consequently are expectedmore to follow “nontransformative” policies that only intent to settle a given disputewith minimum participation in domestic affairs. These dissimilar fundamentalbeliefs about the source of threats form the cost benefit design leaders makewhen they handle interference choices, in two ways. First, causal beliefs affectthe worth leaders place on changing targeted states.
Second, causal beliefsaffect how leaders divide up rare resources that impact readiness for distinctiveintervention strategies (Saunders, 2009). Eventhough this article emphases on the selection of strategy, the issue ofstrategy also effects the decision to interfere in the least. If a leader guessesthat the strategy he selects in order to obtain the wanted intervention result isnot possible or appropriate, then he might be discouraged from taking place inthat conflict in the first place. Accordingly, political leaders’ fundamentalbeliefs about the source of threats have overwhelming significances for the choiceto interfere and for the choice of the intervention strategy, in addition to suggestionsfor the likelihood of the intervention accomplishment (Saunders, 2009).Itis clear that the leaders of a nation play a crucial role in shaping thenations foreign policy. What might be difficult to find is how the nationthings about the foreign policy decisions of its leader, especially in the caseof China. It is easier to find that out about the United States due to itsdemocratic nature and its transparency on such issues. China though, being anauthoritarian nation that has a strict agenda for its media, would be achallenge for that aspect.
I would hope to find at least some concreteinformation in order to back up my hypothesis through this analysis to findwhether or not China can continue rising peacefully.Conclusion Media have the capability to providemultiple channels for information flow and communication between states, stateleaders, and state citizens worldwide. Based on this research, I would like tofind out that war does not rise without uncertainty. Media play a critical rolein promoting security through transparency by decreasing the notion of threatand promoting actions of interdependence. Decreasing the level of uncertaintyand misperception between states through media openness, will lead to the lackof war between states. Recognizing the importance of media openness and nationleaders and their implications for a peaceful rise of China seems crucial todeveloping a fruitful research program intended at empirically testing the centraltheoretical predictions of the lack of war between states.Peacefulrise is an impressive and problematic goal, but it is also a well-intentionedand honorable one.
Attaining it would be an achievement of world historical magnitude.Peaceful rise is conceivable, but it will not be straightforward, and it willnecessitate new thoughtfulness from China. At the vanguard of that new thinkingmust be a more distinct vision of China’s own identity, what type of society itwants to be, and a clearer idea of what kind of international society Chinawants to indorse (Buzan, 2010). China has now risen enough that it cannot avoidthe responsibilities that go with power.Althoughhistory shows us to be cautious of military competition caused by securitydilemma, it also proves that not all instances of rising powers enddisastrously, since no conclusion is unavoidable. The choices of leaders willdetermine how present resistances unfold (Liff & Ikenberry, 2014). Leaderson both sides acknowledge the disastrous regional and global significances of awar in the Asia Pacific today, so even simple steps in order to lessenuncertainty are valuable.
Evading a catastrophic race to military conflict isin the best interests of all states in the Asia Pacific, particularly China. ReferencesBuzan,B. (2010). China in international society: Is ‘peaceful rise’possible?. TheChinese Journal of International Politics, 3(1), 5-36.Callahan,W.
A. (2005). The Rise of China: How to understand China: the dangers andopportunities of being a rising power. Review of International Studies, 31(4),701-714.Choi,S. W., & James, P. (2007).
Media openness, democracy and militarizedinterstate disputes. British Journal of Political Science, 37(1),23-46.Christensen,T. J.
(2006). Fostering stability or creating a monster? The rise of China andUS policy toward East Asia. International security, 31(1),81-126.Hayes,J. (2012). The democratic peace and the new evolution of an old idea. EuropeanJournal of International Relations, 18(4), 767-791.Liff,A.
P., & Ikenberry, G. J. (2014). Racing toward tragedy?: China’s rise,military competition in the asia pacific, and the security dilemma. InternationalSecurity, 39(2), 52-91.Mearsheimer,J. J.
(2010). The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia. TheChinese Journal of International Politics, 3(4), 381-396.Miura,K.
, & Weiss, J. C. (2016).
Will China Test Trump? Lessons from PastCampaigns and Elections. The Washington Quarterly, 39(4),7-25.NyeJr, J. S. (1995). The case for deep engagement.
Foreign Affairs,90-102.Potter,P. B., & Baum, M.
A. (2010). Democratic peace, domestic audience costs, andpolitical communication. Political Communication, 27(4),453-470.Saunders,E.
N. (2009). Transformative choices: Leaders and the origins of interventionstrategy.
International Security, 34(2), 119-161.Yue,J. (2008). Peaceful rise of China: Myth or reality?.
InternationalPolitics, 45(4), 439-456.Wolford,S. (2007). The turnover trap: New leaders, reputation, and internationalconflict. American Journal of Political Science, 51(4),772-788.