To allow the possibility for expansion, the Army must identify the criteria for the exceptional level of troop draw-down.
It should cut it down to the bare minimum and then measure if it can or cannot operate at that level. It must focus on the changes in Total Force, increase the job requirements for incoming recruits, cut conventional programs outside the traditional budget trends (i.e. marketing and advertising, recruiting stations in place of mass advertisement), commit innovative ways to prioritize Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to supplement for loss of training due to budget constraints, and finally develop an Army three-tier organization, centralizing on the ???specialized??™ Soldier. First, the Army should change the standards in which the Total Force operates by developing a new doctrine and mission statement for the National Guard and Reserves. If we identify new requirements in those components of the Army, it can evenly share the eleven missions for the ???Priorities for the 21st Century Defense??? and allow the Active Duty component more flexibility in top mission demands.
Second, the Army should follow the blueprint of the Navy and Air Force by examining the entry-level requirements for a Soldier requesting a specific job (i.e. must have specific civilian/military job experience and educational background, similar to bachelor??™s, master??™s, or technical certificate).
This will spread the knowledge and experience throughout all branches of the Army and allow those specialties to manage the training in preparation for increased Soldiers. Third, if the demand on the amount of Soldiers that join is decreased, proportionally, the budget on public relations should be decreased as well. To further explain, all the departments involved in promoting the Army should be drastically cut from the budget. The departure of departments in marketing, advertising, and even recruiting stations could become significantly lucrative.
Fourth, the Army should replace the requirement of mobilizing to static training facilities and instead commit its focus in prioritizing Mobile Training Teams in order to qualify units either prior to deployment and/or during the fiscal year. The comparison of money saved in maneuvering small observer/controller teams versus units could be substantial. Finally, the Army should consider re-modeling its structure towards a three-tier organization. Essentially, the ones that are ???in the fight??™ are the ones in uniform. The first-tier would be the special operations Soldiers, the second-tier would be the regular Army maneuver Soldiers and the third-tier would be civilian combat support / combat service support. The notion behind this is that if there were a need for more Soldiers in the future, this model would accommodate given that the civilians would still stay in their positions and support tiers one and two.
In conclusion, this approach of the ???bare minimum??™ would alleviate space in both cost control as well as troop numbers, yielding the freedom to add and subtract Soldiers as necessary. The combination of these solutions may not be the only answer to expanding the Army in a constrained environment; however, this is can be a method to opening more options in understanding how the Army can exploit expandability while simultaneously drawing down the force.